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LAWYERS AND THE ABORTION
DEBATE: PRESENTING A
BALANCED VIEW
THOMAS

B.

MCAFFEE*

A LAWYER LOOKS AT ABORTION. By Lynn D. Wardle' and May A. Wood.2
Provo: Brigham Young University Press. 1982. Pp. 250. $7.95.
I.

INTRODUCTION

I am pleased to see the publication of A Lawyer Looks at Abortion because
I believe that legal scholars have much to contribute to the understanding
of public questions. Lay readers too often receive distorted impressions of
legal issues from the media, and those who understand the system best are
frequently too busy writing for the legal community to contribute to the
popular literature. Yet it is legal scholars who are best equipped to make
the intricacies of law accessible to lay persons by defining and explaining
legal terms and doctrines and by examining the reasoning found in relevant
judicial decisions. Lawyers also are trained in the art of advocacy, and legal
scholars can construct able and persuasive arguments on behalf of legal policies and positions. Finally, as trainers of law students in the mental gymnastics of advocacy, legal scholars are uniquely experienced to expose
readers to the competing policies, doctrines, and philosophies that frequently make controversial public issues excruciatingly difficult legal
questions.
I hold a frank bias that the last-mentioned function is the most important service a legal scholar might perform in helping to inform public debate on legal issues. Many writers are persuasive advocates. The need of
most people to understand legal terms and doctrines, or the precise scope of
the holdings of particular cases, is not nearly so pressing as their need to
gain greater insight into precisely what is at stake in the resolution of legal
issues. In my view, the greatest risk of popular books by legal scholars is
that the service of providing readers new perspective on the strengths of
*
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competing values and policies may be sacrificed to that of providing persuasive argument on one side of the debate.
There is admittedly a balance to be struck here. Scholars are people
with views, and they should not refrain from reaching conclusions in books
for lay persons. A scholar also has a right to his belief that a particular
controversial social issue presents rather straightforward legal issues. Striking the right balance is a matter for judgment, not dogma, and the judgment involves a mixture of fair scholarship and personal taste.
Nevertheless, I believe that since the danger is especially acute that lay
readers will take a legal expert's word as the final word on legal matters,
legal scholars have a special obligation to at least acknowledge and fairly
account for opposing views. Legal scholars ought best to understand the
distinction between pure legal advocacy and balanced scholarship and
therefore should see the need to avoid drafting one party's brief when the
judges-in this case the public-may well never read the opponent's. The
purpose of this review is to evaluate A Lawyer Looks at Abortion in the above
terms and, where a defect (in my view) is found, to supply the needed
corrective.
II.

AN OVERVIEW

A Lawyer Looks at Abortion, written by two Brigham Young University
law professors who have written previously on the law of abortion, 3 provides an essential reference work for a lay person interested in exploring the
legal issues surrounding abortion. The book, supplemented by three appendices and extensive notes, will give the reader access to much of the recent
literature and cases on abortion. The book ably summarizes the legal history of abortion, defines and describes its current practice and legal status,
and analyzes the developments leading to the current controversy over the
4
legalization of abortion by the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade. In addition,
it critically reviews the important legal developments in several areas-including public funding, parental and spousal participation in the abortion
decision, informed consent, and the right to refuse to participate in abortions-that have been addressed by the courts since the Supreme Court's
1973 decision. Clearly, the book is the best overall summary of the present
state of abortion law written for non-lawyers that I have seen.
The authors succeed in writing clearly and understandably, providing
straightforward accounts of technical legal and medical terms and concepts.
By and large, they do so without eliminating the complexity of the subject
3. See, e.g., L. WARDLE, THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE (1981); Wardle,
The Cap Between Law and Moral Order: An Examination of the Supreme Court Abortion

Decisions, 1980 B.Y.U.L. REv. 811; Wood & Durham, Counseling, Consulting,and Consent: Abortion and the Doctor-PatientRelationship, 1978 B.Y.U.L. REV. 783; Wood &
Hawkins, State Regulation of Late Abortion and the Physician's Duty of Care to the Viable
Fetus, 45 Mo. L. REV. 394 (1980).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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under discussion. The authors are perhaps at their best in objectively
describing and analyzing the various possible options, including several
proposed constitutional amendments, for reforming the abortion rule laid
down in Roe (pp. 189-205).
Finally, the book persuasively states its main themes: that the Supreme
Court's abortion decision unjustifiably interrupted the political process by
which the law of abortion was moving toward an acceptable state of social
equilibrium, and that the decision was a usurpation of legislative authority.
Most readers with strong moral scruples about abortion on demand, but
with no real commitment to the legal and constitutional issues, will find
much here to persuade them that there is a strong case for constitutional
and legislative reform.
My quarrels are with the book's presentation of these major themes.
Although the book is persuasive, at critical points it fails to acknowledge
and confront opposing viewpoints and policies. Legal principles are stated
more absolutely than they need to be to justify the authors' conclusions.
The result is not only that the perplexing issues in the abortion controversy
are oversimplified, but that readers also obtain no help in determining how
far the principles relied on can be carried in the resolution of legal and
constitutional issues outside the abortion context. The following sections
will outline the basis for these concerns by referring to the authors' treatment of the role societal consensus should play in resolving the abortion
issue, the woman's claim to a right to choose, and the role of the Supreme
Court.
III.

CONSENSUS

A Lawyer Looks at Abortion begins with the premise that "one of the most
important functions of the law . . . is to reflect the moral order of society"
(p. 207). Hence "a law that disregards what most members of society at the
time consider to be compelling moral dilemmas is bad law" (p. 207). From
this perspective, the abortion law reform movement of the 1960's can be
seen as reflecting a growing social consensus that the traditional prohibition
of abortion in all cases except to save the life of the mother was too absolute
(p. 206). Similarly, the "right to life" movement is an indication that the
Supreme Court's legalization of abortion on demand "is bad law because it
takes a position that refuses to acknowledge in law the profound moral dilemmas that trouble most Americans" (p. 208).' Based on this argument,
5. The authors frequently seem to equate public opinion with what is right.
They respond to justifications of abortion for economic hardship or to avoid social
stigma to married women by noting that "the moral or legal justifiability of these
reasons for abortion has never been accepted by a significant majority of people in
this country" (p. 39). A more absolute moral statement that follows is rendered
somewhat ambiguous by this heavy reliance on societal opinion (p. 40). The authors also reject the woman's rights argument because "most people" have trouble
accepting that the unborn, "however they are characterized, are entitled to no legal
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the authors are able to confront the claim of women to an individual right
to choose abortion in two relatively short paragraphs (pp. 40-41).
The consensus argument is persuasively presented and, particularly as
applied to the genuinely thorny moral and legal questions involved in abortion, is bound to have strong appeal. Moreover, few would doubt that there
generally is a strong relationship between law and "the moral order of society.")6 But the authors completely ignore the concerns that always compete
not explain why social
with social consensus as the basis for law; they do
7
consensus should prevail in the abortion context.
Democracies exist to implement majority rules and to protect minority
and individual rights. Many claim that the moral dilemmas involved in
abortion should be resolved by the affected woman, not by majority rule,
and that the right to choose should receive legal protection. Others claim
that the fetus is a person who deserves virtually absolute protection against
a woman's choice. Perhaps both claims should be rejected, but neither can
be rejected on the sole ground that most people disagree. If they could, no
individual rights would be protected against transient majorities, and we
would always be governed by what "most members of society at the time
consider" to be just (p. 207). The success of such a view would undermine
the Bill of Rights just as much as the development of the abortion right of
privacy.
While some would contend that the claim for natural or individual
protection" (pp. 40-4 1). This tendency is nondiscriminatory: "As a matter of moral
reasoning, a rape- or incest-abortion exception may be opposed on the ground that
two 'wrongs'. .

do not make a right. .

.

. But most people are not mere ration-

alists and are persuaded by the human/emotional factor." (P. 36).
6. It should be observed, however, that the question of when, if ever, "the
moral order of society" should control individual conduct that does not immediately threaten the rights and interests of others is a recurrent one among legal thinkers. See generally P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MORALS (1965); H.L.A. HART,
LAW, LIBERTY, AND MORALITY (1962). The issue of abortion, of course, raises the
preliminary question whether another individual's-the fetus's-rights and interests are threatened.
7. Indeed, the authors fail to elaborate their consensus theory. Yet "consensus" is a slippery word that admits of ranges and degrees. A consensus might be
"broad," "strong," or "weak." It might refer to "a majority" or to "virtually everyone." As the authors acknowledge, the law sometimes can be in a state of flux
precisely because there is no strong consensus as to what it should be, as it was
during the pre-Roe period of abortion law reform (p. 208). While a case can be
made that there is a strong national consensus against abortion on demand (p. 277
n. 1), most of the authors' formulations of the consensus argument, as quoted in text,
appear to suggest that it is sufficient that "most members of [American] society
oppose legalization" (pp. 207-08). Moreover, the authors at one point express the
unqualified view that "public policy on fundamental, controversial questions affecting the whole of society (such as the legality of abortion) should be established by
the people or the elected representatives of the people" (p. 206). I therefore assume
that the authors believe majority rule should govern all such questions.
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rights has no basis in a legal world dominated by a philosophy of legal
positivism,8 I confess to being a great believer in the concept of individual
rights. If I were quite persuaded that a woman ought to enjoy a right of
privacy that includes the right to choose abortion, I would not be much
interested in whether there was a consensus-weak or strong-against the
proposition. The stronger the consensus, of course, the more I might be
inclined to consider whether my view was erroneous, particularly if the
question was a difficult one.
Interestingly, when the present authors actually confront the woman's
alleged right, they reject it primarily because of the corresponding rights
and interests of the fetus as a human life. Are they prepared to accept as
"good" a law that comports with an emerging consensus, perhaps ten or
fifteen years from now, that favors abortion on demand? Would such a
view comport with their expressed concern "about the growing abortion
epidemic and the evolving ethic of apparent disregard for unwanted human
life"? (P. 10).
The authors compare the decision in Roe to the 'judicial disaster" of
Ples y v. Ferguson9 because the Court, in "approving direct and invidious
racial discrimination," had deviated from "the liberal ideals of the American judicial tradition" (p. 163).I" But can there be any doubt that an 1896
Supreme Court decision embodying the principles of Brown v. BoardofEduca8. Legal positivism is the philosophy of law that focuses attention on the actual practices and rules of a legal system. A central tenet is the insistence "on the
separation of law as it is and law as it ought to be." Hart, Positivism andthe Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 595 (1958). For a critique of this approach, see Fuller, Positivism andFidelity to Law-A Reply to ProfessorHart, 71 HARV.
L. REV. 630 (1958). There has been of late something of a resurgence of legal interest by lawyers and philosophers in the moral and political philosophy of rights. See
generally R. DWORKIN,

TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY

(1977); R.

NOZICK, ANARCHY,

(1974); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). I do not
believe, however, that all rights that deserve recognition as political rights are ipso
facto judicially enforceable constitutional rights.
9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). The comparison to Roe is presumably that in each
case the rights of the powerless (blacks and the unborn) were sacrificed to the interests of the politically advantaged. The authors also point out that "pro-life" advocates frequently compare Roe to Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 Haw.) 393 (1857),
the case in which the Supreme Court held that black slaves were not "citizens."
STATE AND UTOPIA

Those who make such comparisons, however, will hardly be comforted by the authors' proposed compromise approach.

10. The criticism rings hollow when coming from advocates of rule by consensus. The "liberal tradition" of the American judiciary has been most eloquently
expressed in the creative role it has played in expanding the scope of individual
rights against governmental intervention during the last century. As it did in Plessy,
the Court has frequently felt a tension between that tradition and the need to acknowledge the countervailing force of opposing societal consensus. For a superb
general treatment of the tensions between liberal principle and political reality, see
A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962).
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lion " would have been an immense departure from that era's social consensus on segregation? It is fair to say that Brown itself moved beyond any
consensus about racial segregation and discrimination that existed in 1954.
On that occasion, at least, the Court spoke as the national conscience, becoming the catalyst for the strong social consensus against racial discrimination that has emerged during the last twenty-five years.
IV.

THE RIGHT TO CHOOSE

When the authors do confront the "right to choose" argument, they
fail to acknowledge the dilemma presented by the ambiguous moral and
legal status of the fetus. Thus, the book vacillates between the apparent
view that a fetus should be viewed as a human being in every sense and the
implicit acknowledgement that the fetus appropriately receives less legal
protection than such a view arguably should entail.12 At one point, the
authors assert that the woman claiming a privacy right to decide the abortion question without state interference is in no stronger factual or moral
position than a slaveowner insisting on a similar right (p. 40). The woman
is evading the fact that the fetus is a human being and that the state is
merely coming between her and the decision to terminate that other life.
To be sure, the extreme argument that what is at stake is ony a woman's right to control her own body, which takes no account whatsoever of
the fetus, ignores or begs the crucial questions. Perhaps the slaveowner
comparison is only a response to this extreme form of the argument." But
11. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Ironically, one of the scholarly critics of'Roe cited by
the authors equally decried the "judicial legislation" he saw in Brown. R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 117-34 (1977). Cf.Bickel, The Original Understanding
andthe SegregationDecision, 69 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1955) (raising doubts whether original intent of equal protection clause was to outlaw state-enforced racial segregation). We quickly learn that one person's "liberal tradition" is another's "judicial
legislation."
12. On one hand, arguments based on the woman's privacy and liberty interests are summarily rejected for failing to recognize the corresponding interest of
another human being, the unborn child. On the other, the authors are not troubled
by the historically recognized exception for abortions to save the life of the mother.
They acknowledge the legitimacy of the law's acquiescence in more modern exceptions for abortions to preserve the physical health of the mother, to prevent the
birth of a child with a severe birth defect, or in a case of rape or incest (pp. 33-39,
207). But even with the stress the authors place on the statistical insignificance of
the truly hard cases (pp. 33, 36), and despite their insistence that the hard case
exceptions should be narrowly construed to avoid the "slippery slope" down to
abortion on demand (pp. 34-36, 39-41), they cannot escape the fact that what the
hard cases teach us about our attitudes toward the abortion decision is what makes
the legalization issue so difficult.
13. The authors at other times certainly appear less than absolute that the fetus
should enjoy the full legal status of a person, noting that "most people have more
than a little trouble accepting the argument that the unborn, however they are charac-
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the authors fail to acknowledge that the right to privacy argument can be
developed without ignoring the presence of the fetus and that the slaveowner comparison can be viewed as just as extreme and question-begging as the
view that ignores the fetus altogether. The situations of the woman and the
slaveowner can be distinguished in at least two ways, both of which are
illustrated by the recognition that the law may choose to subordinate the
life of the fetus to the mother's interest in her own life. The "hard case"
exceptions merely deepen our intuition of these distinctions. The legal issue
of abortion largely turns on how relevant we believe these distinctions are to
our judgment of the woman's claim.
The mother's life exception shows that, no matter how much they may
speak of the right to life, most people do not, in fact, view the life of the
fetus in the same way they view the life of a child after birth. Consider the
hypothetical of a prematurely born child resting in an incubator. Two days
after birth, it is determined that the mother will probably die unless she
receives a small blood transfusion. The only available matching blood is
that of the infant, but use of that blood would cause the infant certain
death.14 I think most people would reject the suggestion that we would be
justified in sacrificing the newborn child's life to ensure that of the mother.
Similarly, few would find the hypothetical of a proposed infanticide of a
seriously deformed baby to involve even a hard case that presented a dilemma for legal policy. And while many are sympathetic with the legal
exception allowing a rape victim to choose abortion, almost no one would
countenance the killing of a child merely because it was born as the result of
a rape. If consensus were to be our standard, it appears clear that we would
not equate fetal life with full personhood.
terized, are entitled to no legal protection and that their very lives and being depend
on the whim or caprice of others" (p. 41) (emphasis added).
14. This hypothetical is suggested in Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221, 308-09 (1973). I
am aware that thoughtful moral arguments have been advanced in justification of
abortions to save one life (the mother's) rather than losing two. It is also my understanding that it is precisely this sort of dilemma that confronts the physician who
must decide whether to abort the fetus to save the mother. It is equally true, however, that statutory exceptions have never been limited to such situations and that
most people would justify abortions analogous to Professor Wellington's hypothetical.
I also acknowledge that the proposed distinction is itself based on an appeal to
consensus. It says far less to the absolutist on the human life issue; it speaks mainly
to those who advocate greater, but not virtually absolute, protection of fetal life. In
short, the person who rejects the privacy claim out of hand because of the presence
of the fetus but who accepts the hard case exceptions has some explaining to do.
Even for the absolutist, the fact that 80% of the population is opposed to that position (p. 277 n.1) suggests the difficulties inherent in writing that position into the
criminal law (p. 39). The authors' consensus argument may reflect that they are
simply realistic absolutists.
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The willingness to make the mother's life pre-eminent and to sympathetically consider the plight of women involved in hard cases reflects not
only the differences people intuitively perceive between the status of the
fetus and the child as human life, but also the differences that exist between
the relationship of mother and fetus and the relationship of two independently existing human beings, including slave and slaveowner. The fetus
not only depends on the mother for existence but exists only by remaining
part-an increasingly intrusive part-of the mother. Normally, the mother
submits to this intrusion to give the gift of independent life to the fetus.
Our willingness to subordinate fetal life to that of the mother reflects our
recognition that, like any person giving life-preserving aid to another, she
should have the right to withdraw that aid to protect her own life. Ultimately, it may be in part their unwillingness to ask any person to sacrifice
so much for another that enables many people to believe that abortion is
justified when the mother's life is5 only threatened-even if the fetus could
be saved instead of the mother.'
Similarly, the willingness of many to justify abortion to save the
mother from serious physical harm reflects an inability to insist that hier
sacrifice be so extreme. The hard case presented by the rape situation is
precisely that we are reluctant to impose, as a matter of law, the discomfort,
intrusion, and emotional trauma involved in a forced pregnancy. The serious issue raised by these examples is whether it is consistent with the tenor
of all our laws to insist that a woman complete any unwanted pregnancy.
The authors' reliance on societal consensus to resolve the ultimate issue
blinds them to the continuing debate as to the nature and force of the fetus's claim on the mother.
It does not appear that there is at present any other situation in law in
which we require one human being to submit to the kind of physical intrusion and risks involved in pregnancy to preserve the life of another. It has
thus been persuasively argued that the woman desiring an abortion is similarly situated to a host of persons upon which the law imposes no duty to
sacrifice themselves for others.6 A striking example of the application of
the legal principle against compelling aid is presented by the recent case in
which a court refused to compel an individual to undergo surgery so that
bone marrow could be transplanted to save his dying cousin." The court
15. At least one pro-life philosopher has contended that a general exception for
abortion to save the mother's life is unjustifiable. B. BRODY, ABORTION AND THE
SANCTITY OF HUMAN LIFE: A PHILOSOPHICAL VIEW (1975). Some have contended that the legal justification for the life-preserving exception is the "necessity"
defense recognized in civil law. Whatever the merits of this claim in classical situations, the necessity defense cannot explain our willingness to choose to save the
mother rather than the fetus.
16. Regan, Rewriting Roe v. Wade, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1569, 1579-85 (1979).
17. McFall v. Shimp, Pa. D. & C. 3d 90 (C.P., Allegheny County, Pa. 1979).
See Regan, supra note 16, at 1585 & n.21.
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reached that result even though a human life was at stake, the operation
involved little risk, the prospect of permanent injury was slight, and the
individual was the only possible source of aid.
There is, to be sure, room for debate whether the no-aid principle
should even be viewed as applicable to a woman considering abortion or
whether we may fairly distinguish her case. It can be objected, for example,
that the individual refusing surgery to save his cousin's life is engaged in an
omission, while the woman seeking abortion appears to be engaged in an
act against the fetus. The law frequently distinguishes between acts and
omissions. The response is that the claim of the fetus is not truly similar to
that of the victim of an aggressive act, whose interests may be protected by
simply removing the would-be actor from the scene. The fetus is making a
positive and substantial claim on the woman, much like the cousin's positive claim that the individual submit to bone marrow transplant surgery. 18
On the other side, it can be contended that viewing the woman's abortion decision as a species of refusing aid assumes that the fetus has no
stronger claim than an individual in peril to the use of the body that sustains its life. Is it absolutely clear that this is only the woman's body when a
child has been conceived in it? It can be said that the woman and the
unborn child "share in the use of this body, both by the same sort of title,
viz., that this is the way they happened to come into being."'" By stressing
the natural development of the fetus, one may also contend that, unlike the
drowning swimmer, the fetus "requests" not intervention against the natural forces that threaten its life but forbearance from artificially causing its
death.2" However formulated, the crux of the issue is whether the focus is
18. Regan, Constitutional Amendments on Abortion, 101 LAw NOTES 30 (1982).
Consider the hypothetical of two shipwrecked swimmers trying to reach shore, one
of whom in losing strength deliriously grabs the other about the neck. This hypothetical is suggested by Regan, supra note 16, at 1612. For the second to disentangle
himself would require what appears to be an act against the other swimmer. Nevertheless, it seems doubtful that the law would punish the second swimmer for disentangling himself, even if his chance of carrying both to shore was rather good and
the result of the act was certain death for his companion. While the disentangling
required affirmative action, what is really involved is a refusal to give aid, not an
act of aggression. It has thus been argued that the "central issue is whether the
woman may reject the fetus's positive claim," and that this issue is "much more
basic than whether, because of the special features of the case, the woman's refusal
to aid must be accomplished by seemingly active methods." Regan, supra, at 30.
19. Finnis, The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAw 129,
149 (R. Dworkin ed. 1977). A closely related area of dispute is whether the presence
or growth of the fetus should be viewed as invasive of the woman's body, particularly where the presence of the fetus threatens the life or health of the mother, so as
to raise the justification of self defense on behalf of the abortion decision. Compare
Regan, supra note 16, at 1611-18, with B. BRODY, supra note 15, at 6-12.
20. Pro-life commentators believe that, apart from whether the fetus could initially claim a right to the use of the woman's body, the "causal structure" of abor-
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more properly2 1placed on the woman's autonomy or the uniqueness of the
child's claim.
It is also true that the law has qualified the no-aid principle in circumstances in which persons have voluntarily undertaken to aid others. Since
pregnancy most often results from a voluntary act, it can be contended that
women should be viewed as having assumed the risk that they will be required to aid a fetus by completing the pregnancy. 22 A great deal could be
said about this issue, and in particular the extent to which a woman in our
culture should be viewed as "choosing" pregnancy by engaging in sexual
intercourse. 23 Opponents of the right to choose, however, must in any case
answer the claim that "in no other case do we impose burdens remotely
the burdens of pregnancy on such a slender basis" as "assumpapproaching 24
tion of risk.",

tion, or any activity, is crucial to determining whether it represents "a choice for or
against a basic value." Finnis, supra note 19, at 147. For them it is crucial both that
the fetus is naturally in the womb and that the act of removing the fetus involves a
direct invasion of its person. Id at 147-48; G. GRISEZ & J. BOYLE, JR., LIFE AND
DEATH WITH LIBERTY AND JUSTICE 205-07 (1979). Their opponents contend that
the more basic question is whether the fetus's right to life necessarily includes the
right to the use of the means required to protect it-the woman's body-and not
the precise method by which that claim is rejected. They answer that basic question in the negative and express doubt that the abortion controversy would subside
if women could take a drug that caused a "natural" abortion or if technological
advance enabled us to remove a young fetus from the womb without harming it
(but with the knowledge that it could not be sustained). By any of the means, the
fetus's death is assured and the fundamental question remains whether the woman
was obligated to submit to an unwanted pregnancy. See Thomson, Rights and
Deaths, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 146 (1973).
21. However one resolves the issue, it seems clear that the hardest questions
posed for those who would analogize to the principle against requiring aid reflect
the fact that abortion involves a decision to take action against a being growing
according to its nature.
22. Regan, supra note 18, at 31. It should be noted that Professor Regan would
recognize the state's power to require a woman to choose abortion during the earlier
stages of pregnancy. The claim to an abortion right later in the pregnancy would
be met by an estoppel principle.
23. See, e.g., Regan, supra note 16, at 1593-95; Wellington, supra note 14, at 308.
24. Regan, supra note 18, at 31. A similar argument is that the relationship
between woman and fetus-that of mother and child-justifies the burden we place
on her in insisting that she complete the pregnancy. For comparison of the legal
duty of parents to care for their children and the ways in which it is distinguishable
from a legal duty to carry a fetus to term, see Regan, supra note 16, at 1597-98. The
basic distinction is that the duties of parenthood are voluntarily assumed in the
sense that parents forego the privilege of legally abandoning the child so that others
may provide the needed care. The law generally recognizes a duty to continue aid
where one's assumption of the burden has likely induced others to forego providing
the aid.
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The foregoing is intended to suggest that any legislator must ask the
crucial question whether the situation of a woman considering abortion is
sufficiently distinguishable from the body of law recognizing the right of
individuals to refuse to aid others to justify bringing the force of the criminal law to bear on her choice.2 5 In addition, the considerations outlined
above are at least sufficient, in my view, to force us to consider not only
whether we believe that a woman is morally justified in choosing to terminate an unwanted pregnancy, but whether it is fair to regulate her choice.
Finally, these arguments indicate that a woman's privacy argument
stands on much firmer ground than the slaveowner's essentially nonsensical
equivalent claim, for the issue may be viewed as whether we are willing,
under all the circumstances, to compel a woman to subordinate her interest
in controlling what happens to her body (her privacy interest) to the fetus's
interest in the use of that body. A reader of A Lawyer Looks at Aborlion might
never know that this significant and perplexing issue must be confronted.
V. THE SUPREME COURT
Perhaps the central thesis of A Lawyer Looks at Abortion is that the
Supreme Court overstepped its bounds in striking down legislation prohibiting abortion. To establish this point, the authors rely on the "expert testimony" of judges and legal scholars who have criticized Roe and, in turn,
present their own case against the decision (pp. 267 n.47, 223 nn.8-10). My
concerns are that the lay reader is left ignorant of the expert opinions that
can be produced on behalf of Roe and that even critics of the decision will
not unanimously agree with the relatively broad arguments against the decision made by the authors. At stake are responsibly held, though differing,
theories of the Supreme Court's role in American life.
Leading constitutional scholars were among the critics of the analysis
and conclusions in Roe. The decision unquestionably raises serious and
troubling issues about the Supreme Court's role as an arbiter of constitutional questions. But these authors write as though there is an overwhelming consensus that Roe was wrongly decided, asserting that "it would be a
sad commentary on the state of the judiciary if. . . the Court was [not]
willing to reconsider a ruling that had been so discredited" (p. 208).26 But
25. Many will point to the active method required to abort the fetus and to the
fact that the woman's voluntary act both creates the fetus's claim and establishes a
mother-child relationship, arguing that the abortion situation thus varies from any
other conceivable case in which the denial of aid requires an act resulting in death.
Whether combining of the elements confronted separately above warrants departure from the mainstream of law requiring such sacrifice of an actor's claimed interests is a matter for judgment and careful consideration.
26. The authors cite to only a single authority defending the Roe decision (p.
268 n.58). Even then, they cite to a follow-up work by the same author repudiating
the particular rationale under discussion without observing that the author nevertheless retained the view that Roe was correctly decided.
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leading constitutional scholars have also defended the result in Roe, 2 7 and
there is a substantial body of professional writing, virtually none of which is
acknowledged by the authors, on behalf of a constitutionally recognized
right of privacy.2" These are large omissions from a work containing as
much documentation as this one.
The authors' treatment of the reaction of judges is even more disturbing. They state: "In response to a survey by a political science professor in 1975 and 1976, 165 federal judges and 84 state court judges expressed
their discomfort with the abortion decisions. Most judges in both samples
labeled Roe massive 'judicial legislation'" (p. 163).29 The implication is
that a rather strong consensus against Roe is shown among judges. The
assertion is misleading. The numbers referred to pertain to the total
number of judges surveyed and not, as the statement suggests, the number
30
of judges who "expressed their discomfort with the abortion decisions."
To be completely accurate, it should also be noted that, in fact, the responses of only 147 federal trial judges were deemed sufficiently valid to be
used in writing the article. Moreover, the study stated that many, not most,
of the judges criticized Roe. 3 Finally, the precision with which the author
of the study used "many" is suggested by his earlier statement that "a moderate number of state judges" and "about half as many. . . federal judges"
had commented on the category of cases that included the abortion decision.3 2 It is impossible to tell whether the "many" used to describe Roe's
critics is a term relative to the entire sample ofjudges or to the "moderate"
number of judges who commented on the category to which the abortion
decision belonged. The quoted article establishes little more than that some
members of the federal judiciary disagreed with Roe.
The authors rest their thesis ofjudicial usurpation on the standard crit27. The most persuasive justifications of Roe include Heymann & Barzelay, The
Forestand the Trees: Roe v. Wade andIts Critics, 53 B.U.L. REV. 765 (1973); Perry,
Abortion, the Public Morals,and the Police Power The EthicalFunction of Substantive Due
Process, 23 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 689 (1976); Regan, supra note 16.
28. See, e.g., Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980).
One of the authors has pointed out that over 140 articles and student pieces were
published by legal journals during the three years subsequent to Roe. L. WARDLE,
supra note 3, at xii n.7. With the help of a research assistant, I reviewed as many of
these writings as were available. Of the 51 articles that clearly took a stand on the
merits of the Court's approach in Roe, 30 were critical of the decision, while 21
wrote in defense. The balance consisted of 13 articles that were unavailable for one
reason or another and a host of writings exploring the implications and ramifications of the decision.
29. The article cited is Caldeira,JudgesJudgethe Supreme Court, 61 JUDICATURE
208 (1977).
30. Id at 211.
31. Id at 212. That this was an editorial oversight, however, is confirmed by
the accurate quotation of this source in Wardle, supra note 3, at 827.
32. Caldeira, supra note 29, at 212.
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icism that Roe fashioned a specially protected constitutional right from values found outside the constitutional text (pp. 50-52, 157-64). The lay reader
is thus told: "The word 'privacy' does not appear in the Constitution;
neither does the word 'abortion.' Nothing in the text of the Constitution or
in the history of its creation suggests that the states are powerless to prohibit
or restrict abortion." (P. 159). The authors articulate the view that judicial
review is properly restricted to the vindication of the values found in, or
fairly derivable from, the text of the Constitution." But the reader is never
informed that both sides of this larger debate over the legitimacy of judicial
review that looks beyond constitutional text-the approach most recently
described as "noninterpretivism" 34 -have attracted extremely able advocates and adherents. Moreover, the authors also fail to provide even a hint
as to the tensions between their criticism of Roe and their apparent support
for a great deal of modern constitutional jurisprudence.
Following a pattern set by others, 35 the authors use the shibboleth of
"substantive due process" essentially as a substitute for analysis of why the
Court's invocation of non-textual values was unacceptable. They are from
the school of thought for which it is sufficient criticism of Roe to say that it
bears an analytical relationship to the generally discredited line of cases in
which the Supreme Court intervened against social and economic legislation on behalf of the values of laissez faire capitalism (pp. 50_51).36 This

33. This view has its fair share of articulate supporters. See, e.g., Bork, Neutral
Principles andSome First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); Linde,Judges, Critics, and the Realist Tradition, 82 YALE L.J. 227 (1972). See generall R. BERGER, supra
note 11.
34. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV. 703 (1975).
See also J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980).
35. A number of Roe's critics have written as though the analytical framework
for the decision was clearly distinguishable from a typical first amendment case,
notwithstanding that the incorporation of first amendment values into the "liberty"
protected by the fourteenth amendment is equally "substantive due process" and
equally noninterpretivist. See, e.g., J. NOONAN, JR., A PRIVATE CHOICE 20-32
(1979); Ely, The Wages of Cying Wo."A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973); Epstein, Substantive Due Process By Any Other Name: The Abortion Cases, 1973
Sup.

CT. REV.

159. Cf Grey, supra note 34, at 711-12.

In apparent recognition of the force of Professor Grey's observation on the
noninterpretivist basis for incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth
amendment, Professor Ely has more recently taken to contending for incorporation
of the Bill of Rights through the privileges and immunities clause, as long advocated by Justice Black. J. ELY, supra note 34, at 22-30. Indeed, Ely argues for a
revised reading of The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873), so that
all nine justices are seen as accepting the protections of the Bill of Rights as among
the privileges and immunities of all citizens. J. ELY, supra note 34, at 196 n.59. To
date, the Supreme Court has not accepted either view.
36. To be sure, the authors briefly allude to criticisms of Roe's failures in justifying its result by means of a fair use of precedent or the articulation of a sufficiently
general controlling principle (p. 164), but this supplemental criticism is window-
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charge of "Lochnerizing" a is deemed the end of the argument.
The reader never learns, however, that Lochner has taught varying lessons to its many critics, the largest number of whom are not true interpretivists. Some students of Lochner, for example, would object that the authors
grant apparent approval to substantive due process in its only slightly less
free-wheeling aspects. 38 We sometimes forget that one of the Lochner era's
leading articles criticizing the importation of substantive rights into the
"liberty" protected by the due process clause made primary reference to
applying the first amendment to the states by that technique. 39 If Lochner
counsels against importing values from outside relevant text, the large body
of first amendment jurisprudence must go, not merely Roe. The present
authors fail to insist on taking that step (p. 51).
One of Lochner's leading critics, Judge Learned Hand, became an opponent of the double standard of judicial review under which the Supreme
Court continued to apply strict judicial scrutiny to state action impinging
on Bill of Rights guarantees after abandoning rigorous scrutiny of economic
and social legislation.' This double standard had its origins not in the text
dressing. The authors obviously believe that the Court's resort to substantive due
process is sufficient grounds for criticism.
37. The term comes from Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1895), the leading economic substantive due process case.
38. See, e.g., R. BERGER, supra note 11, at 193-221 (rejecting substantive due
process, root and branch).
39. See Warren, The 'Wew" Liberty under the 14th Amendment, 39 HARV. L. REV.

431 (1926). Cf Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 373 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("Despite arguments to the contrary which had seemed to me persuasive, it
is settled that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment applies to matters of substantive law as well as to matters of procedure.").
40. L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 31-55 (1958). It is significant that the
debate over the double standard rests on the implications of traditional concerns
that the Court show appropriate deference to other branches and levels of govern-

ment and not on a repudiation of its role in checking arbitrary or excessive governmental acts. Even the rational basis test, involving minimal judicial scrutiny,
requires the Court to determine that the end sought is "legitimate" and that the
legislative means bear a rational relationship to that end. Some commentators have
questioned whether the Court has been unduly deferential toward economic and
social legislation that appears to reflect a bowing to interest groups or a disfavoring
of a particular economic group. See, e.g., Gunther, Foreword-In Search of Evolving
Doctrineon a ChangingCourt: A Modelfor a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1

(1972).
When the question is framed in terms of how deferential courts should be to
legislative judgments, two points emerge. First, it becomes clear that we are striving

to avoid judicial invasion of appropriate legislative policy-making, but that we are
not precluding the possibility that courts will find legislation unconstitutional even
though it does not violate a specific constitutional provision. Thus even Justice
Rehnquist, the only present member of the court who uniformly opposes recognition of non-textual fundamental values through the due process clause, has stated
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of the Constitution but in Justice Stone's famous Carolene Products4 footnote. The authors refer approvingly to the Carolene Products doctrine (p.
162), but if the lesson of Lochner is that courts should defer to rational legislative judgments, we should question the entire body of case law-and it is
a chunk-that rests implicitly on Justice Stone's formulation. In any event,
John Hart Ely, the most lucid and thorough-going proponent of a Carolene
Products theory of judicial review, acknowledges that the theory cannot be
sustained on the basis of a purely interpretivist model. 42
Finally, some proponents of noninterpretivism acknowledge Lochner's
deficiency only as a vision of what ought to rank fundamental in the American scheme of liberty.4 3 The same criticism has been advanced against
Roe, 44 but the authors focus almost exclusively on the institutional question
of the Court's role. One unfortunate consequence is that the reader never
learns that the decision's critics cut across the entire spectrum of views on
the doctrine of substantive due process.45 The ultimate result is that a nonspecialist reader of A Lawyer Looks at Abortion is guided to reject as illegitimate a judicial method that characterizes much of modern constitutional
jurisprudence without being brought to understand that the acceptability
of the abortion decisions does not necessarily turn on the legitimacy of the
Court's method.
that the state probably could not meet the more deferential due process test if it
prohibited abortions to preserve the mother's life. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173
(1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist's opinion shows that we are
speaking of matters of degree and judgment, not a prohibition against basing constitutional judgments on non-textual values. Second, we are reminded that we are
discussing only the amount of deference a court should grant the legislature, not the
validity of the principle that as a nation we are constitutionally committed to enacting only laws designed to meet public needs while recognizing the just interests of
all affected groups. In short, a corollary of the presumption of constitutionality is
the duty of legislators to give independent consideration to claims that the proposed
legislation goes beyond the proper bounds of legislation. See Brest, The Conscientious
Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalInterpretation, 27 STAN. L. REv. 585 (1975). That
duty is in tension with the authors' reliance on consensus as the key to resolving
such claims.
41. United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
42. J. ELY, supra note 34.
43. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAw § 8-7 (1978).
44. See, e.g., A. Cox, THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 113-14 (1976).
45. Critics cited in the book's notes include a scholar who rejects any form of
substantive due process (R. BERGER, supra note 11); a scholar who would limit intensive judicial review to situations in which democracy is not working (J. ELY,
supra note 34); and a scholar who believes that substantive due process may include
non-textual values but that the Court failed to justify its result in Roe (A. Cox, supra
note 44). See also Wellington, supra note 14.
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PSYCHOLOGY AND TRIALS: SOME
DISTURBING INSIGHTS
JEFFREY O'CONNELL*

KEITH CARPENTER**
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM.

Edited by Norbert L. Kerr' and

Robert Mf Bray.2 New York: Academic Press. 1982. Pp. 370. $29.50.
The thesis of the book The Lawsuit Lottery is that personal injury litigation depends at least as much on artifice, and even deception, as on research
and logic. In many instances, a favorable judgment depends not on the
strength of a party's case but on the skill with which the attorney practices
the "tricks of the trade." 4 The trial lawyer's work is a blend of substance
and illusion, and it is often the latter that wins the case.
Some highly successful attorneys carefully stage testimony-not to
bring out the truth, but simply to have maximum impact on the jury. Witnesses, as well as the parties themselves, are manipulated to bring out the
partisan point of view. One successful attorney who represents defendant
insurance companies goes to great lengths to confuse the jury as to the true
identity of the defendant. During a trial involving accidental death at a
construction site, he sat with the nominal defendant in the case, the construction supervisor, whom he had dress in work clothes. The plan was to
make the jury think that it was the supervisor, a sympathetic figure, who
would suffer from an adverse judgment, not the wealthy and powerful insurance company with whose funds the jury would certainly be more liberal.5 During the Patty Hearst trial, defense lawyer F. Lee Bailey had his
client wear oversized clothes to minimize her glamor and give her a pathetic appearance. 6 One prominent plaintiffs' lawyer does not allow his client to appear in court except on the day he testifies. As he explains,
A jury should not be allowed to become too familiar with a client-sitting in the same room with him for several weeks conditions the jury to live with the plaintiffs infirmities and to accept
* John Allan Love Professor of Law, University of Virginia. A.B.,
Dartmouth College, 1951; J.D., Harvard University, 1954.
**
Second year student, University of Virginia Law School. A.B., Columbia
University, 1978.
1. Assistant Professor of Psychology, Michigan State University.
2. Research Psychologist, Research Triangle Institute, North Carolina.
3.

J. O'CONNELL, THE LAWSUIT LOTTERY: ONLY THE LAWYERS WIN

(1979).

4. Id. at 29-83.
5. Id.at 31.
6. Id.at 40.
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them. I don't
want my client to be a friend of the jury, but an
7
abstraction.
The Psychology of the Courtroom, a series of essays by various social scientists, edited by psychologists Norbert L. Kerr and Robert M. Bray, is a
critical review of current research bearing on the psychology of trials. Psychology is a crucial discipline because many of the most fundamental assumptions underlying courtroom trials are psychological (p. 2). Decisionmaking powers are entrusted to juries; it is assumed that they are able to
understand their task, overcome their prejudices, judge witness credibility,
and collectively apply the law to reach an equitable verdict. It is also commonly assumed that the adversarial system has certain advantages over
other systems in that it motivates parties to present all relevant evidence
and enhances the fairness of trials.
Many of the studies presented in The Psychology of the Courtroom, however, suggest that these and other assumptions behind so much trial practice
fall far short of the truth. Indeed, psychological factors often seem to preelude a fair, rational trial outcome. Many of the studies in the volume seem
to corroborate the thesis of The Lawsuit Lotteg: personal injury litigation is
chaotic and often dependent on factors irrelevant to the real issues of the
case.
The findings in the book may not be uniformly convincing because
much of the research consists of simulation studies, such as trials with students as mock jurors, rather than studies of an actual courtroom environment. While simulation studies are often justly criticized, they can, in the
editors' eyes, scarcely be uniformly dismissed.8 It is also true that many of
the studies in The Psychology ofthe Courtroom concern criminal trials, not personal injury litigation. Many of the issues studied, however, are substantially the same in both kinds of trials: the adversary system, the
effectiveness of juries, the type of observation called for, the reliability of
witnesses, and the psychology of judging. Both criminal and personal injury litigation are particularly characterized by emotional appeals.9 Criminal defendants and personal injury plaintiffs are often lonely, pathetic
figures. They often face large impersonal institutions-the state, in the case
of criminal defendants, and large manufacturers or insurance companies, in
the case of personal injury plaintiffs. Another important similarity is that
both kinds of trial result from sudden, unexpected, and often violent acts or
occurrences.
On the most basic level, some characteristics of the adversary system
itself may preclude a rational trial outcome, as suggested in the essay on the
7. Id. at 32.
8. See Monahan & Loftus, The Psychology of Law, 33 ANN. REV. PSYCHOLOGY
441-75 (1982). Compare the response of Kerr and Bray to criticism of simulation
methodology (pp. 304-08).
9. See J. O'CONNELL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY: NO-FAULT INSURANCE
FOR PRODUCTS AND SERVICES 6-7 (1975).
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psychology of procedure by psychologist E. Allen Lind' ° (p. 13). The adversary system often introduces information biases. One simulation study
suggests that an attorney who represents the party having the weaker case is
likely to expend extra effort in preparation. When the case is presented in
court, it will appear more balanced than it really is (pp. 21-22). Another
simulation study suggests that testimony of witnesses who are first interviewed by a partisan attorney tends to be biased in favor of the party that
the attorney represents. Testimony of witnesses interviewed by an impartial attorney, however, is comparatively objective (p. 22).
In the adversary model, the two parties must take turns presenting evidence. Studies suggest that hearing first one side of a story, then the other,
gives rise to additional bias. Most studies indicate a "recency effect"-facts
presented more recently have more influence on subjects' conclusions about
a case than facts presented earlier. The party presenting its evidence last
thus seems to have an unfair advantage (p. 25). True, the recency effect is
limited, but in a way that presents a different bias. When subjects are asked
to form opinions about other individuals, the party presenting evidence first
has the most influence. Therefore, in trials where the character of a party
or the credibility of a witness is at issue, the jury will apparently tend to be
biased in favor of the view presented to them first (pp. 25-26).
12
In their essay on jury selection, Valerie P. Hans" and Niel Vidmar
show how difficult it is to assemble an impartial jury (p. 39). Jury panels
from which jurors are selected are supposed to be representative cross-sections of their communities. There is some evidence that representative juries might be better fact-finders than homogeneous juries, although the
research is not conclusive (pp. 42-43). Another argument in favor of representative juries is better supported: they help make the verdict and the
legal process in general acceptable to all segments of the community. But,
given the rationales for representative panels, the procedures for assembling
panels fall far short of achieving them. Most communities use voter registration lists as their primary source of panel members, but these lists usually
underrepresent several groups, especially young people, racial minorities,
and the poor (p. 45). There are also indications that people may even fail
to register to vote solely because they do not want their names to be used for
jury panel selection.' 3
Voir dire selection may not much improve the chances of selecting an
impartial jury. The assumption that juror bias can be uncovered during
cursory questioning is based on what is asserted to be an outdated model of
psychology that does not recognize the existence of unconscious bias (p. 55).
10. Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Illinois.
11. Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice and Psychology, University of
Delaware.
12. Professor of Psychology and Associate Professor of Law, University of Western Ontario.
13. J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 85.
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The court may be unable to discover bias if the juror himself is unaware of
it. According to one study, "Voir dire was grossly ineffective not only in
weeding out 'unfavorable'jurors, but even in eliciting the data which would
have shown particular jurors as very likely to prove 'unfavorable.'" (P.66).
This distortion is attributed in part to the observed lawyers' practice of
spending only twenty percent of their voir dire time asking questions
designed to identify biased jurors and eighty percent on "indoctrination,"
i.e., "commenting on points of law, preparing the jurors for trial, forewarning jurors about negative pieces of evidence, and ingratiating themselves
with jurors" (p. 66). 4 Another study suggested that lawyers' use of peremptory challenges to try to exclude unfavorable jurors had no impact on the
verdict in nine or ten of the twelve trials studied (p. 67)." 5 Further, the
study found great differences among attorneys in the effectiveness with
which they exercised peremptory challenges to create favorable juries (pp.
67-68).
14. The authors summarize the results of a study by Dale Broeder:
From posttrial interviews with jurors, Broeder concluded that with a few
notable exceptions, these indoctrinational strategies were generally unsuccessful. But it should be stressed that Broeder's conclusions were based on
rather unsystematic observation of the voir dire proceedings and retrospective posttrial interviews; thus, the conclusions have obvious limitations.
• . . While. . . [indoctrinational] questions, therefore, may not function effectively as a vehicle for weeding out biased jurors, they might well
reduce the overall level of bias by sensitizing jurors to areas where they
may be less than impartial. Further, public commitments to be impartial
may increase jurors' ability to set biases aside. [Pp. 66-67]
15. The authors describe the results of a study on the effectiveness of the juror
challenge system:
It is usually impossible to know how effective lawyers' challenges are, since
prospective jurors who are challenged never get to vote in the jury room.
In their ingenious experiment, however, Zeisel and Diamond arranged for
the challenged jurors in twelve criminal cases to serve as shadow jurors
who remained in court throughout the trial and voted at the trial's conclusion. The information about the challenged jurors' votes, in conjunction
with the knowledge obtained by posttrial interviews of the real jury's valid
vote, allowed Zeisel and Diamond to "reconstruct" what the vote of the
jury would have been without peremptory challenges. Comparing the reconstructed jury's vote with the real jury's vote allowed them to estimate
the lawyers' effectiveness in using peremptory challenges to create more
favorable juries. Zeisel and Diamond reported that in 7 of the 12 trials,
the effect of the lawyers' challenges were minimal; the verdict of the reconstructed jury and the real jury were likely to have been identical. In the
remaining five cases, however, the difference in first ballot votes of the two
juries were more substantial, and in two or three of'these cases might well
have resulted in a different verdict. In all five cases the real jury was less
likely to convict the accused than was the reconstructed jury. [P. 67]
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Since the early 1950's, some attorneys have been experimenting with
"scientific" jury selection (p. 68). lVor example, a poll may be conducted in
the community where the trial is to be held. Persons are asked demographic questions, such as age, occupation, education, and political affiliation. They are then asked about their attitudes toward the case at hand.
Demographic factors that seem linked to favorable attitudes toward the
case are used in constructing a model of the most favorable juror, and attorneys then try to find jurors to match the model during voir dire (p. 70).
Conversely, a model "bad" juror-one to be avoided-is also constructed.
Defense attorneys have generally been quite successful in the publicized
criminal cases in which scientific jury selection has been used, like the Joan
Little trial (p. 69), but most research indicates that success in these cases
should not be attributed to scientific jury selection. Most of the trials at
issue involved charges of criminal conspiracy, which are difficult to prove
under most conditions, and the prosecution evidence was generally quite
weak (pp. 72-73). In addition, Hans and Vidmar suggest that a lawyer who
goes so far as to use scientific selection methods probably works exceptionally hard on all aspects of the case and the lawyer's diligence alone might be
responsible for the trial outcome (p. 73).
In another essay, psychologists Francis C. Dane1 6 and Lawrence S.
Wrightsman' 7 bring together research that indicates that juries may be influenced improperly by extralegal characteristics of the defendant and the
victim (p. 83). Although more research is needed, the authors point to evidence that the gender of the criminal defendant may have an inappropriate
influence. Gender may, for example, interact with the type of crime and
the defendant's general attractiveness. In a study of a simulated burglary
charge, women were handed shorter sentences than men when both were
portrayed as attractive, while women and men received equivalent
sentences when both were portrayed as unattractive (p. 90). It is clear that
attractive criminal defendants tend to be more leniently treated than unattractive defendants (pp. 101-04),18 unless attractiveness could have facilitated the crime, as in the case of fraud (p. 103). Jurors are less likely to
convict defendants of the same race as themselves and more likely to convict defendants not of the same race (pp. 104-07). To some extent, jurors
who perceive themselves as having attitudes similar to those of the criminal
defendant are likely to treat him relatively leniently (pp. 107-08).
Another factor that Dane and Wrightsman believe calls for more study
is the socioeconomic status of the criminal defendant. Some research suggests that criminal defendants of higher socioeconomic status are viewed by
jurors as more trustworthy and less deserving of blame than those of lower
16. Assistant Professor of Psychology, New York State University.
17. Professor of Psychology, University of Kansas.
18. The authors cite one study that examined civil cases. It concluded that
"attractive litigants won their cases more often than less attractive litigants, but
only in cases with exclusively male juries" (p. 101).
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status (p. 92).19 Another simulation study manipulatedpereivedsocioeconomic status of the defendant; jurors saw defendants they perceived to be of
high socioeconomic status as less guilty (p. 93).
Findings concerning what Dane and Wrightsman term the criminal
defendant's "moral character" clearly indicate its influence. For example,
the jury is responsive to its own extralegal perception of the criminal defendant's responsibility. One simulation study indicates that jurors are
more likely to convict when they know that the defendant has been found
guilty of other offenses in the past (p. 96). A jury is less likely to convict if
the defendant had an accomplice or if he did not plan the crime himself
(pp. 96-97).
On the subject of eyewitness testimony, Steven Penrod,2 ° Elizabeth F.
Loftus, 2 1 and John Winkler22 examine testimony in light of the four stages
of information processing (p. 119). They conclude that "eyewitness reliability is a problem that is systematic in nature" (p. 122).
The first stage of information processing is perception. It is well established that distortions in perceptual judgments are common, One early
study indicated that subjects tend to overestimate distance and duration of
events but tend to underestimate the size of filled spaces, such as furnished
rooms (pp. 122-23). Such distortions can be very significant. In one study,
subjects overestimated a criminal defendant's height by an average of eight
inches; in another, subjects overestimated the length of a film by a factor of
three (p. 123). Yet accurate perception by witnesses of distance and time
can obviously be crucial to accident litigation. In a trial involving an automobile accident, for example, witnesses are often asked the crucial question
whether a driver was speeding. But to judge speed, the .witness would
under most circumstances have to judge the distance traveled by the car
during a fixed period of time-a judgment apparently very difficult to
make accurately (p. 123).
The second stage of information processing is encoding. A number of
factors affect the accuracy with which information enters the memory system or is "encoded." In a classic experiment by Ebbinghaus, subjects'
memory of nonsense syllables, as one might expect, improved in proportion
to the number of times they were exposed to them (p. 124). Another unsurprising factor is the length of time the witness is exposed to the event; statistics have confirmed that memory improves in proportion to the length of
time that subjects are exposed to voices and various kinds of pictures, including pictures of faces (pp. 124-25). The kind of event to be recalled also
influences the accuracy of memory. In one early study, memory for mun19. The results of archival studies (actual trials as opposed to simulated studies), however, indicate no relationship between criminal defendants' socioeconomic
status and either conviction rate or length of sentence (p. 92).
20. Assistant Professor of Psychology, University of Wisconsin.
21. Professor of Psychology, University of Washington.
22. Associate Social Scientist, Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California.
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dane facts, like details about a building where the subjects met or weather
conditions a week earlier, was shown to be quite inaccurate (p. 126). Conversely, another study indicated that unusual scenes were more likely to be
remembered than ordinary ones. Research also indicates that stationary
objects are less likely to be remembered than moving ones (p. 126). To
some degree, memory improves as an event becomes more stressful, but
memory is undermined as the event becomes excessively stressful. One
study indicates, for example, that completeness of crime victims' descriptions of their assailants is inversely proportional to the level of violence involved in the crime and the extent to which the victim was injured (p. 127).
In addition to event characteristics, a number of witness characteristics
have also been proved to influence the accuracy with which information is
processed. One powerful influence is the witness's expectation, which in
criminal cases may be shaped by stereotypes of "criminal" appearance and
personality characteristics, and in all cases by cultural and personal expectation. A classic study in this area showed a marked inability among subjects to identify such unexpected objects as a red ace of spades (p. 130).
Information that must be "deeply processed" is more likely to be
remembered by the witness than information requiring only shallow
processing. For example, subjects called upon to judge likeability and honesty of persons based on their photographs are more likely to be able to
identify them later than subjects who had been called upon to determine
the gender of the persons in the photographs (p. 139). Memory can also be
improved if the event is "rehearsed" after its occurrence-as, for example,
when the witness reports it promptly to the police (pp. 133-34).
Many of the factors affecting encoding of information are clearly relevant to accident litigation. Generally, accidents only occur once and occur
quickly, so the witness is only exposed to them for a very short length of
time. It is true that accidents are by definition extraordinary, but the surroundings or circumstances of the accident may be quite mundane, especially immediately prior to the accident. In an auto accident, for example,
the actual collision might be remembered accurately, but the mundane yet
critical details-such as whether a light was red or green-might be forgotten. 23 An accident would probably be considered stressful for any witness,
23. For example, Keeton and O'Connell have noted:
[T]hough unplanned, a traffic accident of any severity is nevertheless attention-catching, and . . . once attention has been focused, details that

otherwise would have been forgotten are fixed in the memory. But the
point is not that traffic accidents are too commonplace and unplanned to
attract attention. Rather, the point concerns the contrast between the distinctive, attention-catching results of smashed cars and people, on the one
hand, and the commonplace details of the prelude to the collision, on the
other. Indeed, the attention-catching nature of the resulting damage to
person and property may inhibit rather than facilitate one's memory of
the preceding events. Neither his perception or his memory is likely to be
focused on the kinds of details that are asked for in the trial of a traffic
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but the character and circumstances of witnesses vary so widely that an
accident that would be only moderately stressful to one witness would be
excessively stressful to another. A particularly insensitive witness's memory
might be aided by the stressfulness of the accident while another's might be
impaired, and a jury might be unable to tell the difference. Finally, given
the brief length of time a witness is likely to be exposed to an accident, there
is probably not enough time for the "deep" processing that supposedly enhances accuracy.
The third stage of information processing is rememberig, or storage of
information, and it is as vulnerable as the first two. It has long been known
that witness accuracy declines with the passage of time (pp. 135-36). In
addition, "interference" can reduce witness accuracy. For example, asking
a witness misleading questions about an event before he testifies may undermine his memory of the event. In one study, subjects were shown a videotape of an auto accident and were immediately asked how fast the car was
traveling "when it passed the barn." One week later, a significant minority
of subjects reported that they saw a barn in the film-though, in fact, there
was no barn (pp. 136-37). The factors affecting memory in this third stage
are also highly relevant to accident cases. There is often a wait of years
between the time an accident is witnessed and the time of trial when events
must be recalled, given the ponderously slow pace of litigation.
The fourth stage of information processing is recall, or retrieval of information. The way questions are asked may well affect witness accuracy at
this stage. For example, estimates of the speed at which two automobiles
were traveling when they crashed into each other varied significantly depending on whether the terms "collided," "bumped," "hit," or "contacted"
appeared in the question (p. 139). The form the questions take can also
influence recall accuracy. In one study, responses to definite questions
("Did you see the dog?") proved less accurate than the responses to indefinite questions ("Did you see a dog?") (p. 138). In another study, subjects
viewed films of an automobile accident and then were asked questions that
called either for free narrative ("What happened?") or controlled narrative
accident case. It may be suggested, in answer, that this argument applies
to all negligence cases. But rarely in other areas of daily experience are
ordinary human beings in command of such highly dangerous machinery. . . . [The danger stems from the fact that both the masses and the
speeds of cars exceed those of any other machines with which we work.
Perhaps the constant exposure to this danger dulls the sense of peril and
the significance of the details of its creation. Or perhaps the mind intuitively finds other facets of these traffic incidents more significant and
memorable than those details on which claims adjusters and lawyers focus
in preparing and trying negligence cases. In any event, it is rare in human
experience that so much is made to depend upon details that no one involved can clearly recall.
R. KEETON & J. O'CONNELL, BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM 18-19
(1965).
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("Describe X"). Free narratives were found to be more accurate but less
complete than controlled narratives (pp. 138-39). Like the third stage,
then, the fourth is vulnerable to manipulation by persons who know how to
ask misleading questions.
The problem of eyewitness unreliability is compounded by the undue
weight that jurors tend to give eyewitness testimony. In one study, a mock
armed robbery incident was described. Of subjects who were exposed only
to circumstantial evidence, eighteen percent convicted. But of subjects who
heard an eyewitness account in addition to the circumstantial evidence, seventy-two percent convicted. A third group of subjects was given discredited
eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence. They were told that the
eyewitness had very poor vision and was not wearing glasses at the time of
the incident. Still, the third group convicted at a rate only slightly lower
than the second-sixty-eight percent (p. 54-55).

In an essay on witness credibility (p. 169), communication professors
Gerald R. Miller2 4 and Judee K. Burgoon 25 cite studies that demonstrate
what jurors understand to be clues that indicate lying. These include "less
eye contact, more tension and nervousness, slower responses to questions,
excessive gesturing and swallowing, increased nonfluencies, greater 'stiffness,' unnatural smiles or 'tight' faces, squinting and adaptor behaviours
such as scratching the head" (p. 180).2' But in fact, juror accuracy in detecting lies is quite low. The authors cite seven studies dealing with subjects' accuracy in detecting deception (p. 184). In five of the studies,
subjects were accurate on average only about half the time. Even in the
study showing the highest rate of accuracy, subjects were incorrect about
one-third of the time. From these studies, the authors conclude:
Observers are not veg successful in detecting deceptionperpetratedby relative
strangers .

. .

. Observers in most . . . studies would probably

have done as well had they flipped a coin to determine if the communicator/deceivers were lying.

.

.

. [The research appears to]

paint a discouraging picture concerning jurors' ability to make accurate assessments [of lying]. [P. 186]
Moreover, research indicates that subjects tend to feel quite confident about
their assessments of deception and truthfulness even when they are wrong.
"Translated to the courtroom environment, this finding raises the spector of
jurors evaluating a witness's veracity inaccurately while remaining very certain of the correctness of their evaluations." (P. 186). One explanation for
the low level of accuracy in detecting deception is that the behavior that the
subjects associate with lying, supposedly the product of the desire to
deceive, can also arise from the stress that anxious or involved witnesses
would naturally feel in a courtroom (p. 186).

24. Professor of Communication, Michigan State University.
25. Associate Professor of Communication, Michigan State University.
26. The authors do not define "nonfluency." We take the term to mean the use
of inaccurate, inappropriate language.
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In 'his essay on the individual juror, psychologist Martin F. Kaplan2 7
examines the impact of bias on a juror's decisions (p. 197). Some studies
indicate that biases themselves are systematically related to general personality traits. For example, favorable attitudes toward the death penalty appear linked to "dispositions toward stringency," i.e., a tendency to be
conservative compared to liberal, or authoritarian compared to egalitarian.
This results in attitudes more stringent toward punishment of criminals and
toward law enforcement. Jurors with favorable attitudes toward the death
penalty are more likely to convict (p. 202). Bias has also been linked to
factors more transient than general personality. In one study, mock jurors
subjected to a number of annoyances by the judge, "including unnecessary
and irrelevant remarks and conferences and obnoxious lectures about courtroom decorum and rules," were more likely to rate the defendant guilty
(pp. 203-04). Another observation suggests that jurors reporting a personal
dislike for the defense attorney may be more likely to convict (p. 203).
Turning to other sources of juror bias, Kaplan examines criminal defendants' characteristics, pretrial publicity, and inadmissible evidence.
From the studies in these areas it may be tentatively inferred that these
factors-at least pretrial publicity and inadmissible evidence-bias jurors
in inverse proportion to the reliability and validity of admissible evidence.
In the absence of strong admissible evidence, then, jurors may well be influenced by bias stemming from various extralegal sources such as pretrial
publicity and inadmissible evidence (pp. 206-11).
Kaplan also outlines an important paradox inherent in the prevailing
view of the jury's role, i.e., that the jury is not necessarily expected to follow
the strict letter of the law but may use discretion in applying the standards
of the community. 28 This view of jurors, according to the author, "departs
from the notion that they are to come to the trial with a 'blank mind' and
an impartial attitude" (p. 210). Legal thinking, writes Kaplan, has yet to
resolve the question whether this inroad into the policy of jury impartiality
is desirable (p. 210).
Jury deliberations are examined in an essay by Gerald Stasser,29 Norbert L. Kerr,3 0 and Robert M. Bray3" (p. 221). Jury deliberations may be
subject to a number of influences that can interfere with rational disposition
of a case. Selection of the jury foreman is often influenced by irrelevant
factors such as sex and position at the jury table, as well as by occupational
status and prior experience as a juror (pp. 223-24). Although the authors
draw no conclusions about the influence of the foreman on the jury's decision, research clearly shows that foremen tend to talk more than other jurors (p. 226), which may or may not give them an added degree of influence
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Professor of Psychology, Northern Illinois University.
See a/so J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 88.
Associate Professor of Psychology, Miami University (Ohio).
Associate Professor of Psychology, Michigan State University.
Research Psychologist, Research Triangle Institute, North Carolina.
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(p. 233).32
Further, there are marked differences in the level of participation
among individual jurors (p. 225). Those who talk the most, and who therefore perhaps wield the most influence, tend to be male, well-educated, of
relatively high occupational status, and to sit at the ends of the jury table
(pp. 226-27). Whether any of the factors linked to higher levels of participation are relevant to rational disposition of the case has not been established (p. 227).
While more research is needed, it is possible that other, perhaps irrational, factors influence not only the organization and deliberation of the
jury but also the outcome of the trial. If, at the beginning of deliberations,
the majority believes a criminal defendant is not guilty, it is highly likely
that the majority will prevail. The majority is less likely to have its way if it
belieyes that the criminal defendant is guilty (pp. 236-37). This bias, of
course, is not necessarily irrational. On the other hand, the "information
exchange process . . . [may be] merely a front disguising the operation of
more subtle normative processes" (p. 252). "Thus, a juror favoring [a]
guilty [verdict] who encounters several other jury members who favor acquittal might experience a discomforting threat to his or her self-perception
of fairmindedness." (P. 250). The authors believe that both informational
and normative processes are at work in deliberations (p. 250). To the extent
that normative processes are at work, outcomes are still at least partially
determined by arguably irrational factors.
An essay on the psychology of judging by Anthony Champagne 3 and
Stuart S. Nagel 34 (p. ?57) suggests that judges often are influenced by factors other than the issues directly involved in the cases before them. Judges'
group affiliations-i.e., religious, ethnic, and political-play a role in their
selection as judges (p. 260). 3 1 Political party affiliation is particularly telling in predicting how a judge will decide cases (p. 264). Democratic judges
tend to decide cases more liberally than Republican judges.3 6 To a lesser
extent, other variables such as organizational affiliation, class background,
religion, and tenure have also been correlated with liberal voting tendencies
(pp. 264-65). One study examined voting patterns of federal judges in draft
evasion cases and found that judges who had draft-age sons tended to be
32. The authors note that studies are inconclusive as to whether the foreman's
tendency to talk more than other jurors makes him more influential (p. 233). But
for a study equating more talk by a juror with more influence, see J. O'CONNELL,
supra note 3, at 101.
33. Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Texas (Dallas).
34. Professor of Political Science, University of Illinois.
35. See also J. O'CONNELL, supra note 3, at 108-09.
36. By "liberal," the authors seem to mean, among other things, bias in favor of
the defendant in a criminal case and bias in favor of the plaintiff in a civil case. See
Goldman, Voting Behavior on the United States Court of Appeals Revisited, 69 AM. POL.

SC. REV. 491, 492 (1975).
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more severe in sentencing draft evaders than those who did not (p. 265).
Another study, examining voting of Southern federal district judges in race
relations cases after Brown, found that the judges most likely to be pro-integration were Republican, more cosmopolitan than segregationist judges,
and far less likely to have held state political offices (pp. 265-66).
Another influence is judicial attitude, which is seen as being formed by
judicial background. One early study noted marked disparities in the rate
at which New York City magistrates dismissed cases before them. The
overall conviction rate for public intoxication cases, for example, was
ninety-seven percent. Yet one judge dismissed seventy-nine percent of those
cases. One judge dismissed almost no disorderly conduct cases while another dismissed eighteen percent and another, fifty-four percent (p. 265).
The researcher concluded that these disparities could be explained only by
differences in attitudes among judges, noting that "the process of judicial
decision is determined to a considerable extent by the judges' views of fair
play, public policy, and their general consensus as to what is right and just."
(P. 268).
Additional research suggests the importance of courtroom interaction
between judges and attorneys and judges and juries. One study found that
the most important influence on the setting of bail is the prosecutor's recommendation. Recommendations of defense attorneys were less influential
but still important (p. 270). Champagne and Nagel infer from this study
how much judges are dependent on attorneys. Regarding interaction between judges and juries, the authors note that "it is well known to trial
attorneys" that "juries have a mind of their own" (p. 270). One study suggests that juries readily ignore judicial instructions (p. 270).
If much of The Psychology of the Courtroom confirms what is known intuitively, the book is nonetheless a comprehensive yet succinct review of the
efforts that have been made to study courtroom psychology scientifically.
Sustained research in the field began only relatively recently, in the 1950's,
and many aspects of the psychology of the judicial process remain to be
investigated3 7 But the picture that emerges from The Psychology of he Courtroom is unmistakable: litigation is influenced and often controlled by factors that are irrelevant to a rational, fair trial outcome. Much depends on
which party speaks first and which speaks last. Methods for excluding biased jurors are often ineffective. Characteristics of the defendant that have
nothing to do with guilt or liability, such as gender, socioeconomic status,
attractiveness, and race often are influential. Eyewitness testimony is sub37. In addition to the present work, several other books have recently been
published on the psychology of the adjudicative process. Among them are C. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY AND AMERICAN LAW (1982); M. GREENBERG & R. RUBACK,
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1982); J. LOEWEN, SOCIAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM (1982); M. SAKS & R. HASTIE, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN COURT

(1978); NEw

Lipsitt & B. Sales ed. 1982);

DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH

THE TRIAL PROCESS

(P.

(B. Sales ed. 1981).
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ject to numerous influences that render it highly inaccurate. It is difficult
for jurors to accurately assess witness credibility. Irrational factors appear
to influence jury organization, deliberation, and possible trial outcome.
Judges may be influenced by their group affiliations, such as political party
and religion, and their general attitudes.
The picture that emerges, then, is clearly corroborative of the thesis of
The Lawsuit Lotter-that the outcome of lawsuits is determined by very
irrational factors as well as by reason and fairness. In addition, the two
books complement each other. Each has a different emphasis. The focus of
The Psychology of the Courtroom is on the most basic assumptions underlying
our system of litigation: its adversary nature, the competence and impartiality of jurors, the effectiveness of testimony, and the impartiality ofjudges.
The emphasis of The Lawsuit Lotteg is less on the system itself than on its
uncertainties and abuses. But ultimately one is struck by how The Psychology
of the Courtroom maps the fertile fields giving growth to those uncertainties
and abuses. One is struck again at the accidents of litigation in accident
litigation.
But what is the alternative to the courtroom? All the vicissitudes of
trials are, after all, hard to dispense with in criminal cases-and many civil
cases as well. We can hardly punish people criminally without exhaustive
exhumation and examination of the applicable facts and laws; a similar
situation arises when the question is whether to burden a party to a contract with the costs of an alleged breach threatening either party's solvency.
The adversary system seems as good as, if not better than, any other means
of resolving the merits of such cases. But at least as to accidents involving
personal injuries, alternatives in the form of insurance arrangements such as
workers' compensation and no-fault auto insurance can dispense with the
need for most litigation.3" The Psychology of the Courtroom, without explicitly
doing so, points to the wisdom of those insurance-based alternatives to
litigation.
38. See J.

O'CONNELL, supra

note 3, at 157-75, 186-222.
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